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CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN PROTRACTED TRANSITION AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF ACTORS: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREAN  
MOVEMENT HISTORY AND PARTY POLITICS 
MINYOUNG KIM 
ABSTRACT 
 Twentieth century has seen a significant number of social changes, taking in 
different forms of revolution, revolts and protests. Nevertheless, as the world stabilized 
with the termination of Cold War, contention also seemed to have died down. Dominating 
theories concluded with generalizations that contentions are inevitable process of social 
change; it comes and goes. South Korea, on the other hand, remains an anomaly due to 
contentious actors’ persisting influence in the society. In reality, contention does not exist 
in isolation from the society, but arises from the very soil of it. South Korea actors, the 
institutions and parties reflecting contentious identity attests its protracted existence 
beyond the contentious episodes. I argue that contentious politics is not an isolated event 
that belongs in the transitionary period, but is capable of creating a continuously interacting 
variable in the society. Thus, in the case of South Korea and its protracted democratization, 
contention needs to be understood as an organic product of South Korean history that 
continues to influence the contentious identity to fulfill their self-perceived historical duty 
of achieving a legitimate government. 
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Introduction: South Korean Story  
After four decades of dictatorship, South Korea democratized in 1987 when the 
military dictator, Chun Doo Hwan surrendered by declaring a direct, popular presidential 
election. The historical decision was made as an aftermath of the nationwide popular 
protest that erupted in June 1987, triggered by the culmination of police brute force against 
protesters into death of a college student, Park Jong Chul from torture.1 Amidst the irony 
of military dictatorship thirty years after the initial promise of democracy in 1948, the 
social movements against the dictatorship were symbolized the legitimate social force, that 
succeeded the patriotic fight against the foreign occupation and national humiliation that 
started in 1930. In a country charged with Confucian ideals, student social movements, in 
particular, protesting at the vanguard of the oppressed masses became the celebrated 
tradition in line with social respect towards scholarship (Lee 1993, 353). Student protests 
alone, the numbers increased from 7,819 in 1945 to 296,640 by 1975 across the country.2  
While the unprecedented popular protest, mobilized across social sectors from 
students to workers’ unions, religion groups led to Chun’s giving into institutional 
democracy, yet implementing a de facto democracy in South Korea took another decade, 
when Kim Dae Jung was elected by the South Korean people amidst the authoritarian 
remnants still remaining powerful.3 Despite freedom promised, a pro-Chun candidate, Roh 
                                                 
1 Dong-A Ilbo. 1987. “College Student Death After Police Investigation 大學生(대학생) 경찰調
査(조사)받다 死亡(사망) 民民鬪(민민투)관련.” Accessed on February 21, 2018.  
2 Mason, Edward S., et, al. 1980. The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 
Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. 378.  
3 Whether Kim Young Sam’s 1990 three-party merger should be considered a compromise with the 
authoritarian faction remains a controversy (Lee, n.d.). This paper considers it an act of compromise as the 
paper primarily concerns the popular sentiments rather than the more ambivalent academic assessments. 
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Tae Woo was elected in 1988 and in the subsequent election, a previously pro-democracy 
candidate Kim Young Sam who colluded with the authoritarian faction party.4 The moment 
remains as a point of irony in the South Korean democratic history. Nevertheless, the 
reality does not seem to have changed fundamentally. The year 2018 marks twenty-year 
anniversary since the election of the former president Kim Dae Jung. While the dramatic 
impeachment of the former president Park Geun Hye marks a political watershed, South 
Korean establishment still largely represent the authoritarian past and those in government 
and corporations remain invincible in the greater South Korean society. 
 In looking at the case of unfinished democracy in South Korea with continuous 
contention between social classes and political parties albeit amidst the stability on the 
surface, this paper aims to understand the South Korean version of contentious politics and 
understand its continuity and discontinuity in comparison with the existing contention 
literature and the application of existing theoretical variables like the political opportunity 
structure, the democratic institutionalization of contentious actors. In doing so, the 
empirical review focuses at the historical review of “Woon-dong-gwon,” the South Korean 
term for movement actors, in protracted transitional, democratization context with case 
study of South Korean parties that originated from the movement actors, their ruptures, 
interactions with the establishment parties amidst the continued reality of contention in 
South Korea in the broader light. The analysis will mainly use the comparative-historical 
analysis of archival data and public records.   
                                                 
4 Bank, David and Peter Leyden. 1990. “3 Leaders Unite To Form New S. Korean Party.” ChicagoTribune. 
Accessed February 17, 2018. 
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1. Empirical Question 
 With various political and ideological changes, the twentieth century has seen 
explosions of social movements, change of social and political dynamics, with varying 
scale as large from a complete upheaval of social fabric through Peasant Revolution in the 
People’s Republic of China to moderate social contention within democracies like the ’68 
movement in Germany or anti-Vietnam protests in the United States in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, most social movements within the context of democracy or democratic 
transition have been temporary and often episodic events of which demands have been 
quickly institutionalized by policymakers. Once the demands have been realized, the social 
actors may continue voicing their opinions in the public, but would soon lose their 
contentious identity on the particular issue of the past. On the other hand, South Korea 
presents a case of continued existence and persisting reality of movement politics and the 
identity of “Woon-dong-gwon” (to be translated as “movement actors” literally).  
While movement politics have been much deemphasized since 1987, movement 
politics have consistently been observed in almost all the major junctures of South Korean 
politics regardless of party domination. These cases include some of the early social 
movements that took place right after the first popular election of the opposition party 
president, 1991 Second June Struggle against the three-party merger, as well as those into 
the democratic era, from Free Trade Agreement protest under Roh Moo Hyun 
administration to Mad Cow Protest under Lee Myung Bak and the most recent 
impeachment protest against Park Geun Hye. In terms of the established theories of social 
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movement and the proposed parabolic cycles, one would expect an immediate or even a 
gradual demobilization.5 
 
Figure 1. South Korean General/Illegal/Violent Protests  
(Korean National Police Agency White Paper)6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relative Volume of “Woon-dong-gwon” Entered on South Korean Google Search  
(January 2004 - March 2018)7 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Tarrow, Sidney. 1995. Power in Movement. Cambridge University Press. 95. 
6 Korean National Police White Paper. n.d. Korean National Police Agency. 
7 GoogleTrends is a search data and visualization service provided by Google.Inc. The service shows how 
much the search term was entered on Google Search relative to total search made in different regions. In 
this case, the search term was entered exclusively in South Korea by 99%.  I have chosen the particular 
period, because January 2004 was when the service began. As South Korea rapidly globalized in the early 
2000s with increased internet supplies, interpretations based on a U.S.-based search portal would not 
significantly distort public interest on the search-term.  
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In addition to its surprising persistence, the movement actors’ continued autonomy 
as well as political significance is another distinct feature of South Korean contentious 
politics. Even after the military regime compromised for a popular election and the Kims 
were democratically elected, much authoritarian supporters were left in the South Korean 
parliament, making it difficult for the democratically elected presidents to make any policy 
progress. Therefore, both Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Jung had to rely heavily on appeal 
to the public, through the movement actors of 1987 struggle to pressure the reluctant 
parliament. Such legislative strategy has declined overtime, as South Korean presidential 
election stabilized, such initial political climate allowed autonomy and political 
independence with ambiguous, but substantial political legitimacy apart from the elected 
and often corrupt parliament.   
Therefore, though the self-identified movement actors have been much less 
contentious in their social expressions, their political significance and the consistently 
active role in contentious politics in an extended period of time makes it difficult to 
conclude contentious politics to be demobilizing in South Korea. How have contentious 
politics and movement become more than social decisions and actions, but a persisting, 
self-chosen identity even after an advanced democracy, albeit imperfect one, have clearly 
been achieved in South Korea?  
The second question arises in the episode of United Progressive Party dissolution 
decision by the South Korean constitutional court in 2013 with disenfranchisement of the 
elected party representatives and the other “movement party”, Justice Party’s inaction, or 
lack of protest. This was the first time ever a political party was disintegrated in South 
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Korea under the legal auspices not to mention the lack of similar precedent in the Western 
liberal democratic history besides banning of neo-Nazi parties in the 1950s Germany. 
November 5, 2013, former president Park Geun Hye filed a claim to disintegrate the United 
Progressive Party to the South Korean constitutional court as decided at the presidential 
cabinet meeting. All the subsequent legal processes were delivered by the prime minister 
at the absence of the president as she went off for the presidential summits in Europe. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Park’s trial request came at the time of the ruling Saenuri Party’s 
election fraud scandal, simultaneously with the Prosecutor’s Office’s summoning Park’s 
main competitor in the 2012 election, Moon Jae In on the day of Park’s departure attracted 
much controversy that Park and the ruling party was trying to cover the election fraud with 
other issues.8 
The constitutional codification of political parties is an uncommon provision in the 
American-based constitutions like that South Korea. Though some of the post-war 
European countries – particularly those with fascist or extremist party history – have 
codified parties as constitutional institutions like in Germany or Italy, much of the 
jurisprudence in the United States have freed the parties from the state intervention as 
private associations that are to be determined by the people.9 Thus, in terms of codification, 
South Korean constitution follows suit of the U.S.; banning of a political party in South 
Korea was not much of a legal norm both in terms of codification as well as of precedents. 
                                                 
8 Han-kook Ilbo. 2013. “United Progressive Party Disintegration Trial Request: A move to political 
turnaround… Is it an election fraud cover? [통진당 해산심판 청구] 국면전환용 정치적 카드… 
대선개입 의혹 불끄기인가.” Accessed on February 24, 2018. 
9 Van Beizen, Ingrid. 2011. “Constitutionalizing Party Democracy: The Constitutive Codification of 
Political Parties in Post-war Europe.” British Journal of Political Science 42(1): 207;  
Conradt, David P. 1992. The German Polity. New York: Longman Publishing Group. 84. 
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As the decision was made by the constitutional court, rather hurriedly in 2014, controversy 
over the legitimacy of the decision and potential bias of the primarily conservative judges 
of Constitutional Court at the time.10 According to Gallup Korea, 63% of South Koreans 
supported the decision, while 23% opposed, and according to Focus Company Korea, 33% 
of South Korean constitutional law scholars supposed the decision, while 46% opposed.11 
 Before and after the decision was made, academic and popular debates on the 
decision’s legitimacy exploded, and the United Progressive Party members protested 
against the decision, claiming it to be an undemocratic, revert to the 1980s dictatorship. 
Nevertheless, another branch of the movement politics, Justice Party never showed 
significant sympathy towards the United Progressive Party or showed opposition towards 
the allegation. The inaction from the Justice Party begs the question of the internal 
dynamics of the South Korean movement politics in the twenty-first century. For a party 
with virtually the same origins with the United Progressive Party, one would expect some 
form of opposition, if not solidary from Justice Party. 
2. Theoretical Question   
The persisting movement politics in South Korea has theoretical implications in the 
broader field of contentious politics. South Korean version of movement politics puts forth 
                                                 
10 Lee, Duk Yeon. 2015. “The Decision of the Dissolution of the United Progressive Party – Not from the 
Perspective of Right or Wrong but of Rhetoric.” Journal of Constitutional Court Decisions 16:43. ; 
Kim, Jongcheol. 2015. “Is the Constitutional Court the Sovereign Institution? – Dissolution of the Unified 
Progressive Party and Constitutional Identity of the Republic of Korea,” The Justice 151: 31  
11 Cho, Geun-ho. 2013. “46% of Constitution Scholars support preserving United Progressive Party, while 
33% supported dissolution 헌법학자 46% "통합진보당 유지", 33% "해산해야.” CBS Nocut News. 
Accessed on February 24, 2018. ; 
Gallup Korea. 2013. “Opinion Index” Gallup Korea Daily Opinion 145. 
http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportDownload.asp?seqNo=619  
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the case of a “protracted transition” along with sporadic, but continued episodes of 
contention. Unlike most conventional theories that focus on the high moments of 
contention and the individual episodes, the case of “protracted transition” bought about 
various processual features created along with the extended struggle. One of the distinct 
features of the South Korean transition is the creation of a new social, political identity 
“movement actors” or “Woon-dong-gwon” in Korean.  
In South Korea, however, “movement actors” goes beyond the functional definition, 
but defines a persisting identity. Within the episodic conception of contentious politics 
literature, a byproduct of persistent nature is an unexplored dimension. The protracted 
period of contention due to the decades of military dictatorship gave birth to a generation 
that grew up with constant social mobilization that grew to form an informal social 
movement faction. Called the “movement faction,” this informal, private group was mostly 
composed of the college students and young workers and swore their loyalty to the 1970s 
and 1980s protest virtues as well as to the sacrifices made in the past by laborers as well as 
the patriotic figures of the historic independence movement in the 1930s.  
In terms of the existing contentious politics literature that focuses on the temporary 
episodic transitions, how can the case of South Korean contentious actors be explained in 
their protracted transformations and shaping of their political identity? Also, if contentious 
is to naturally dissolve overtime as the existing contentious politics literature predicts, how 
do we explain South Korean self-identifying “movement actors” and the continued reality 
of contention?  
  
9 
 The empirical and theoretical questions pose reasons why we must care about 
contentious politics and its actors in the now seemingly functioning democracy of South 
Korea. First, we cannot disregard the movement parties and associations for its relative 
decrease in size as regular political actors in comparison to 1980s, because of the actors’ 
continued self-identification to belong to the “movement” as well as the consistent 
observation of their influence in South Korean politics in terms of collective action as well 
as party politics. Second, as the systematic analysis of modern political interaction in South 
Korea is quite young and has been borrowing the mainstream theoretical frameworks that 
have largely originated from the Western literature, an analysis of a distinct phenomenon 
native to South Korea may offer a nuanced perspective to the field.12 In order to address 
these empirical and theoretical questions, this paper will look at the indigenous features 
that developed in the South Korean contentious behavior, particularly in the context of a 
protracted transition, rather than as an episodic event. This paper will also trace the causes 
of the persisting reality of “movement identity” in the actors’ ideological psychology, its 
path dependency and history of movement and opposition party development.  
3. Definitions  
 The usage of word “movement” (called “Woon-dong” in Korean) has been used in 
South Korea in a much broader context than in the Western academia, and particularly 
when describing the actors. The field’s most prominent contemporary scholars, Charles 
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow defined contentious politics as:  
                                                 
12 Shin, Gi-wook, Paul Chang, Jung-eun Lee, Sookyung Kim. 2007. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement 
(1970-1993).” Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report.  
Hou, Zhengye and Yunxia Zhu. 2012. “An institutional perspective of public relations practices in Chinese 
cultural contexts.” Public Relations Review, 38. 916 
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Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared 
interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of 
claims, or third parties… Contention involves making claims that bear on 
someone else’s interests.13  
 
Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects 
when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to 
the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one 
of the claimants.14  
 
The term has been coined with a broad concept overarching collective action, the political 
struggle and physical, active protest. However, the scholarship has been limited precisely 
to the action of contentious politics, the causes, mechanisms and individual histories that 
it lacks systematic analysis of the actors involved or what happens to the actors after 
contentious politics. However, the political junctures, in reality, has much more ambiguous 
boundaries with the same actors that enters the new rule of the game. Therefore, this paper 
will look in depth on the identity crisis and roles of the contentious actors both before the 
democratization in South Korea and after.  
Conception of Movement Politics in the South Korean Context and the “Woon-dong-
gwon” Identity 
“[I]n politics, unlike in the marketplace, losers do not necessarily disappear and 
their ‘adaptation’ to prevailing institutions can mean something very different from 
‘embracing and reproducing’ those institutions, as in the worlds of technologies and 
                                                 
13 Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. Contentious Politics. London: Paradigm Publisher. 5. 
14 McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow and Chales Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge 
University Press. 5. 
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markets.”15 This is clearly the case in South Korea. Though the “losers” and “winners” of 
the game actually are not as clear as “democratization” implies, the losers on both 
authoritarian regime and contentious actors alike have not died with democracy in 1990. 
In essence, the authoritarian regime was preserved in the South Korean parliament, albeit 
with the concession of the presidential dictatorship. In the case of contentious actors, the 
movement circles have become solidified in retaliation to the incomplete removal of the 
authoritarian elements.  
First of all, the popular election was the only first step to democracy, but it was by 
no means a perfect, full step. The authoritarian heir, Roh Tae Woo in the presidency, the 
establishment succeeded in pressuring the progressives to concede to a three-party merger 
that increased the authoritarian party to expand its power in the parliament. As the result, 
Roh administration gained greater power to oppress low-income workers by unfair wage 
reforms, comprehensive workers investigation and physical oppression of protestors. By 
wage reform, Roh administration implemented total wage system that legally prevented 
wage increase by more than 5% – a rate much lower than that of inflation.16 Continued 
efforts to repress democratic transition was clear. In response, “Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (NCTU)” was established in 1990, the same year as the three-party merger. 
NCTU consisted of 14 provincial association, 2 occupational association, 456 unit union 
                                                 
15 Thelen, Kathleen. 2003. “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analyis,” in 
James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge University Press. 231. 
16 “National Labor Union Association Establishment.” n.d. Korea Democracy Foundation Open Archives.; 
Hankuk Kyungjae News, 1992. “President Roh Requested Promotion of Total Wage System at the State 
Council Meeting 노대통령, 총액임금제 적극 홍보 당부...국무회의서.” Accessed on March 2, 2018. 
http://news.hankyung.com/article/1992052100521 
 
  
12 
and 166,000 association delegates.17 According to Paul Chang’s recent book that came out 
along with comprehensive research effort from Stanford Korea Democracy Project, 
workers union had started developing since the 1970s despite military oppression. The final 
creation of NCTU and their proactive involvement in contentious performances 
demonstrate that movement actors did not demobilize after institutional democratization, 
but consolidated. 18  During the Roh administration, 1,973 union board members and 
workers were imprisoned from national union investigation, union-led protests and even 
from conglomerate union strategy meetings. 19  The case of NCTU establishment, in 
particular, demonstrates the porous border before and after a political juncture like 
democratization, where the excitement of new freedom and resilient past coexist. The 
establishment of NCTU is one example of contentious actors’ consistent solidarity.  
Besides the NCTU, democratic South Korea has seen many substantive movement 
politics that resist even the newly established rule of the game, and these movements 
increasingly formed a persisting identity. An interesting phenomenon accompanied with 
this movement identity is how new watershed contentious performances brings with them 
similar nationalist and fatalist theme as the 1980s and 1990s movements. In this context, 
the term, “Woon-dong-gwon” was coined to refer to not just the actors involved in the 
contentious collective action but it also absorbed the identity of contentious generation that 
grew up under the military oppression and protracted transition from underdeveloped to 
                                                 
17 “National Labor Union Association Establishment.” n.d. Korea Democracy Foundation Open Archives. 
18 Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim. 2007. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement.” 32. ; 
Chang, Paul. 2015. Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’s Democracy Movement, 1970-
1979. Stanford University Press. 176.  
19 “National Labor Union Association Establishment.” n.d.  
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developed, from authoritarian regime to a democracy and also the transition from the 
socialist-dominated ideology to widespread liberal democracy. Therefore, South Korean 
“Woon-dong-gwon” connotes much more ideology than how a contentious actor is 
described in the Western literature. With the particularistic formation of South Korean 
movement, its identity and continuation, an intimate understanding must be accompanied 
in reviewing the existing literature on contentious politics in depth.  
Literature Review 
1. Development of the Contentious Politics Literature  
 Contention, in its most intuitive forms of disputes, protest, revolts and revolutions, 
has existed throughout human history, but a systematic study of it only started very recently 
for its age after the medieval West first saw the dawn of modernity and as the world started 
to see some of the greatest ideological dichotomy, continued social turbulence throughout 
the post-World War era across countries. Then, the world has seen a certain drop of 
attention the topic in the past twenty years except for efforts to consummate previously 
compartmentalized works in the field.  
Word frequency graph below extracted from Google Scholar database shows a 
rough history of the field. Data points are extracted from the word “contentious politics” 1) 
total appearance, 2) number of pages that “contentious politics” appeared and 3) number 
of books that contentious politics appeared. Each small peak prior to the 2000s roughly 
corresponds to the classical work of Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto (1848), Vladimir 
Lenin’s State and Revolution (1917) and Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions 
(1979). Through 2000, as some of the contemporary scholars’ officially consolidating the 
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field of “contentious politics” in Political Science discipline, we see a cascade of books on 
contentious politics, case studies and comprehension efforts, leading to a sudden rise in the 
frequency. The following literature review investigates the history of the rather broad add 
scattered interdisciplinary field of contentious politics. The review will conclude with the 
efforts to comprehend the sudden drop of interest, and the discontinuity of reality – 
particularly that of South Korea – with such academic disinterest towards the end of 2000.  
 
Figure 3. Frequency of the word “Contentious Politics” used between 1800 and 2008 (from 
Google Scholar DataBase)20  
 
 
 
 
2. History of the Field 
Two Trends: Macro-historical to Political Processes 
 Two biggest decisions made in understanding contentious politics have been 
whether to view contentious politics as a macro-historical event that takes place in the 
realm of meta-individual social structure, or as consequences of the decisions made by 
                                                 
20 Google NGram Viewer  
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political actors in a sequence of political process.21 This is also reflected in the practice of 
the Social Science discipline as shown in the separate association of the RC47, the 
Research Committee on Social Classes and Social Movements and the RC48, the Research 
Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change under the 
International Sociological Association. While the two research networks are in no means 
in competition with one another, but the two committees’ objectives show the different 
variables that the members use in viewing contentious politics: 
RC47 Objectives: i. to promote the development of theory and research in the 
sociology of collective action and structural determinants of social movements 
and social classes…22  
 
RC48 Objectives: i. to foster intellectual, academic and scholarly exchanges 
between researchers of broadly defined social movements, social change and 
collective action.23 
 
RC47 is streamlined on the class interaction and structural or exogenous determinants of 
social movements, while RC48 focuses on the processual interpretation of collective 
action, the decision making and endogenous factors of social movement – also with much 
broader adoption of disciplines.  
Marxist Class Struggle and Classic Structuralist View  
 RC47-type trend of contentious politics interpretation comes from the classic 
structuralist approach, primarily focusing on the variables of class relations, the 
interactions among actors in an institutional context and theory leading the social analysis. 
                                                 
21 Tarrow. 2012. Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics. 7. 
22 “Research Committee on Social Classes and Social Movements.”  2012. International Sociological 
Association.  
23 “RC48 Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change.” 1994. International Sociological 
Association. Accessed on March 1, 2018. https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/research-networks/research-
committees/rc48-social-movements-collective-action-and-social-change/ 
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The structuralist view has gone through variations of theoretical projections and some 
scholars made diversions from the classic Marxist or Weberian approach by using different 
institutional variables or in their dialectics, significant substance of classical contentious 
politics literature was influenced by Marx and Weber (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997, 6).  
 The architects of modern structuralist thinking, Marx and Engels conceived of 
social movement as an inevitable course of human history. This Marxist and Engelian 
conception of history, however, is exclusively that of class struggle.  
 “Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to 
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that 
each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in 
the common ruin of the contending classes…. 
 
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: 
it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting 
up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other 
— Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.” 24  
 
While Marx or Engel do not explain the causal mechanisms in which the classes come into 
conflict – or how they even gain collective consciousness in the first place –, the watershed 
work of Communist Manifesto laid out the social progression model with socialism as the 
end goal based on the conflictual social class system as a functioning assumption. In 
essence, all historical phases have various social classes, and once their interests are fully 
developed, the social classes naturally form an antagonistic dichotomy. This either leads 
to a collective struggle that moves onto the next phase of struggle or a failure to achieve 
collective action leaves the society underdeveloped. According to Marx, the nineteenth 
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century was under the conflict of bourgeoisie and proletariat, awaiting the collective, 
contentious performance of the proletariat to overcome the capitalist bourgeoisie.25  
Structuralist conception of the world based on Marxist conception is largely 
inductionist, unidirectional and materialist, in a way, resembling the Newtonian science 
philosophy, where sufficient social force is met, society will progress into the next phase.26 
The constituents are not organic actors involved in determining the directions. With the 
undefined, exogenous impetus of history to determine the societal destiny, Marxism left 
many questions behind to be filled.  
Edition to Marxism: Lenin and Gramsci 
Some of the biggest questions that Marxism left behind was how the Proletariats 
were to be mobilized and why they would mobilize, under what momentum. This was a 
particularly important question to Vladimir Lenin, the founder of Volshevik Party, as a 
backward, agrarian Imperial Russia clearly did not have the social force ripen or the 
collective consciousness of Proletariats at all, and thus would have to wait for the natural 
social advancement. Seeing from the case of Western Europe, where the presence of 
Proletariats did not necessarily lead to an overarching revolutionary social consciousness 
as Marx and Engels predicted, Lenin tried to reconfigure the leadership variable as the 
revolutionizing factor. Thus, Lenin conceptualized the “Vanguard Party” as another 
preliminary factor of social revolution that would enable the mobilization of workers, seek 
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right interests for them and shape collective consciousness under the vanguard leadership. 
This edition of theory by Lenin is made largely applicable to the social reality of Imperial 
Russia in the 1910s. The Russian working class was too thin, underdeveloped and more 
importantly, lacked the transcending collective consciousness. The Russian bourgeoisie 
were also very weak and tied to the state and landowners, which extracted their ability to 
form a democratic movement. Thus, Lenin concluded that the ordinary people were unable 
to make the decisions truly beneficial, thus, are in need of a guiding leadership. 27 
Nevertheless, Lenin also does not explain what a mature working class looks like to qualify 
as the Vanguard Party.28 
Leninism and the Vanguard Party indeed brought about a huge change in the 
revolutionary rhetoric though in different forms in different regions. Leninism took root in 
revolutionary Soviet Union, developed into the Stalinist brand of socialism, and it also was 
implanted into Communist China, by Mao Zedong. On the other hand, however, contention 
that is sufficient in the eyes of the structuralists remained largely as a tradition of the East. 
The Vanguard Party was not able to realize a Western Communist revolution. Italian-
American historian Paul Piccone in 1976 records that the West has started to seriously 
reconsider Marxism at the face of the Communist Party’s failing to mobilize the workers 
like predicted by Leninism.29  
Western Communism and Cultural Hegemony by Gramsci  
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The problem of limited Western Communism was the primary concern of Antonio 
Gramsci. Initially convinced by the Leninist explanation of why a universal and 
comprehensive mobilization failed in the Western Hemisphere – that is the lack of 
leadership, Gramsci himself joined the Communist Party of Italy, which in his sense the 
Italian Vanguard Party. Nevertheless, Gramsci witnessed the Volshevik Party’s failure to 
spread into an international revolution, particularly in the West, and his own country’s fall 
under fascism, Gramsci concluded that the Vangaurd Party leadership strategy was 
insufficient to penetrate the Western society.30  
In his time in prison, Gramsci came up with “Cultural Hegemony” as what was 
needed in universal, contentious mobilization: “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the 
great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and 
consequence confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and 
function in the world of production.”31 While Gramsci’s explanation also remains largely 
parasitic to the assumption of preordained future, modernity and unidirectionalism, the 
conception of cultural hegemony within the ruling groups attests to the tendency of 
convergence to the political process explanation, where individual decisions play 
meaningful role in social movement. Gramsci’s mobilizational force also largely rests upon 
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the elites or the “dominant group,” but contemporary contentious politics scholars like 
Sidney Tarrow later assess Gramsci’s mature works, nevertheless, brings attention to 
“collective” aspects of social movements, mobilization with a working class 
“consciousness” counting in the process in the form of “consent.” 32  
The classic structuralist explanation of contentious politics is largely tied to the 
framework of class struggle and is framed as a fatalistic social sequence. Nevertheless, 
within the consistent theme of class struggle, the history of structuralist development has 
had to reconfigure new variables to explain newly found phenomena.  e.g. the Vanguard 
Party, Cultural Hegemony, etc. Scholars from the political process and cultural 
explanations tend to see such tendency to have come from limiting the with locating causal 
variables from the theoretical induction. Thus, the culturalists and contemporary scholars 
made a breaking point from the Marxist structuralism into greater focus on political 
progress, the endogenous dynamics with historiographical methodology.   
Classic Culturalist Approach  
Ambiguous Discipline and Tocqueville’s Combined Approach  
 In comparative politics, culturalist explanation is generally defined as 
“understanding the varied ways of life, systems of meaning and values, analysis of cases 
to understand particular phenomena.” 33 Culturalists tend to attribute contentious causese 
to norms, values, beliefs and symbols. The methodology may include include  In contrast 
to structuralist explanation of contentious politics and its belief in mobilization of the 
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people based on unidirectional assumption of preordained socialist future of mankind, the 
culturalists have been much more attracted to the cultural and processual explanations.  
 The classic culturalist discipline is not as clearly delineated as the Marxist theorists, 
due to various reasons – most important reason in this case would be the fact that 
contentious politics field was not a distinct academic discipline nor was there a clear 
consciousness about contention as a generalizable social phenomenon. Furthermore, 
culturalist focus of the explanation does not mean a complete disregard of structuralism. 
Early culturalist accounts of bourgeois or socialist revolution are more of a mixture of 
interpretation. Thus, culturalist interpretations have significantly enriched the field already 
saturated with Marxist structuralism. Amidst the disciplinary ambiguity, however, the 
contemporary contentious politics scholar Sidney Tarrow and Charles Kurzman locate the 
first classic culturalist as Alexis de Tocqueville and his observation of French Revolution 
in his latest overview of the field.34  
 Tocqueville’s observations of the French Revolution in the 1955 provided a noble 
view of social movement by his primary focus on the 1) individualistic structure of France 
and 2) the individual’s decision to take advantage of the opportunity.35 Tocqueville argued 
that the there was a structural cause and a cultural cause. The first structural cause was the 
French government’s alienating the people from their rule by over-centralization of the Old 
Regime, discarding the intermediary aristocracy. Second cause points to the French 
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populace’s view of loosened pressure from above – the aristocracy – which led to the 
French people’s perception of “political opportunity.”36 
By this “combined approach,” Tocqueville was able to offer a noble conception of 
structure and empowerment of individuality in social movements. First, Tocquevillian 
structural cause is essentially different from that of Marxist’s. In contrast to Marxist focus 
on the macro-individual or even macro-social structure that transcends one single structure 
of a society, Tocqueville’s explanation regards a particularistic aspect of structure that is 
indigenous to French society and French history. Moreover, the sequence of his 
explanation is also substantially different from mainstream structuralist view. Instead of 
assuming a preordained future of the French society and predicting a social movement via 
a certain class, Tocqueville tries to explain the causality of a past event. Tarrow assesses 
such contribution of Tocqueville as a “statist” structuralism in contrast to Marx’s classicist 
structuralism.37 Thus, Tocquevillian approach, to be picked up by contemporary scholars 
in the 1980s and 1990s, offers a qualitatively different approach and purpose: from 
prediction with theorizing as methodology to greater focus on explanation with 
historiography as a main methodology.  
 A well-known example of a prominent contentious politics work developed from 
the Tocquevillian combined approach would be Theda Skocpol’s France, Russia, China: 
A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions. Succeeding the structuralist traditions from 
her mentor and dissertation – the book’s prototype – advisor Barrington Moore, Theda 
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Skocpol provided criticisms of Moore’s Marxist approach, but at the same time, 
incorporated in her book the statist structural explanation in her own work with 
comparative sociological interpretation. In particular, Skocpol focused on the inherent 
vulnerabilities of social structure that the three countries had at the time of revolution, 
which Skocpol points out as the “agrarian bureaucracy.” Then Skocpolfocuses on the 
different interactions of French, Russian and Chinese agrarian bureaucy with the external 
pressures imposed or the incapacitation of administrative and military as the differentiating 
factors of revolution from the bottom.38 While Skocpol’s approaches remained largely 
structuralism-based – with her self-evident title of the book –, Skocpol’s approach 
demonstrates a transition from the classical structuralist theories by considering individual 
social factors as important variables while leaving the Marxist, or Barrington Moore-type 
predictions of unidirectional routes of modernizations.39 
Transition to the Contemporary Perspectives, the Gap and Interdisciplinary Influences 
 Tarrow assesses that the literature of contentious politics has made a substantial 
stride since the end of Cold War from “combined approach” largely based on structuralism 
to contemporary literature that drastically shifts it theoretical basis to collective action, 
resources, social organization and transition theories. 40  Structuralism did begin to 
incorporate elements of collective action – for example, Gramsci’s idea of cultural 
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hegemony added the need for consensus and collective initiative beyond the level of 
political elites. The added factor of collective action does not, however, explain the 
contemporary break from the persisting theme of class struggle in structuralism. While the 
evolution in the contentious politics literature itself needs greater appreciation for increased 
consideration of collective action, this paper aims to identify the shift in literature and 
locates it in the influences of the interdisciplinary study of contentious politics, particularly 
from comparative politics and sociology where a lot of political process approaches 
originated from theories of modernization, democratization and transitions.  
Social Transition Literature: O’Donnell and Schmitter  
 While the study of modernization, democratization and transitions flourished in 
both comparative politics and sociology, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s 
work has been foundational in offering alternatives in viewing transition with new 
variables like political process, emphasizing the historiography and individual decision 
making, digressing from the mainstream structuralist arguments in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
Transition from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter view democratization or 
some form of transition from authoritarian regime as inevitable due to most post-1945 
authoritarian regimes’ initial promise of freedom and popular sovereignty.41 In explaining 
the transition, O’Donnell and Schmitter focuses on the internal variables rather than 
external factors, which authors argue to be arbitrary variables that cannot be systemized in 
theory. In particular, O’Donnell and Schmitter identifies the fluctuating cleavage between 
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the softliners and hardliners as the determinants of authoritarian transitions. Rather than 
structuralist categorization of the two groups by economic, social classes, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter focused on the political interaction dynamics of groups with different perceived 
realities. O’Donnell and Schmitter’s softliners are “those aware of the necessity of some 
sort of electoral legitimization in order to avoid a destructive fallout” and hardliners are 
“those that believe that continued perpetuation of authoritarian regime is possible.”42 In 
further elaboration of transition process as determined as the product of the group 
interactions, O’Donnell and Schmitter discusses the political pact formation and 
significance of political timing.  
 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s work, Transition from 
Authoritarian Rule is not essentially a work on contentious politics, yet their particular 
focus on the process of political transition and contentious ramifications offer a new light 
in understanding contentious politics through contextualization. First, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s assumption that individual decisions are central in determining social transition 
and its direction substantially digresses from the Marxist view of social transition as a 
necessarily revolutionary one and a preordained human destiny, by leaving transition to the 
whims of individual political tendencies and their own perceived realities. Second, the fact 
that the social transition directions are determined by not one, but a collective of hardliners 
and softliners leads to the contemporary contentious politics scholars’ focal point of 
collective action. In combination with the increasingly inclusive structural discourse on the 
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actors of contention, Guillermo and O’Donnell offer a new mechanism where political 
negotiations and processes replace dichotomous class struggle in the backdrop.  
Dominant Contemporary Interpretation and Contentious Sixties 
 The decade of 1960s was a particularly important period in determining the 
direction of contemporary contentious politics studies. 1960s have seen a rise of 
comprehensive social movements across the liberal world, and protests became a social 
norm in the United States, of which institutions were most influential in shaping academic 
fields. 1960s for the U.S. in particular was a series of transformative moments, a 
paradoxical period charged with domestic confusions with the fall of the long-ruling liberal 
and international tensions coming from the U.S. incapability in the time of Cold War. The 
period of prosperity from the U.S. victory in the World War, the end of Korean War in the 
previous decade in the backdrop of the omnipresent tension from the Cold War brought 
about alternative America – civil rights movement for blacks and women, advocates of 
pacifism than continued Cold War rivalry, the creation of a powerful youth culture to 
further the New Left and increased support for expanded participatory democracy over 
interest group politics. The rise of civil rights movements was not just a series of protest 
but were considered the second Civil War.43  
Similar contentions were found in Europe as well. For example, 1968 Generation 
across the world has revolted against the existing order. The United States went through 
historical moments like the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr., and 
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witnessed a systematic creation of student groups, such as the Students for Democratic 
Society, representing the “New Left” and the Young Americans for Freedom, representing 
the “New Right.” Student-based riots took place in France with Charles de Gaules’ failure 
and China was under a massive overhaul of Cultural Revolution, students leading the Red 
Guards. In Germany, generational transition brought about an enormous political juncture 
in the Christian Democratic Union-dominated system. Germany’s first subsequent 
generation since World War II reached adulthood in the late 1960s and grew to be the 
radical young leaders that started questioning their national history and responsibility for 
the crimes of Nazi era. The collective radical young leaders, later to be coined as the “68ers” 
turned up against the system that they perceived to be permeated by the older generations 
that have compromised with the remaining Nazis or previously Nazis themselves. 
Collective and simultaneous rise of the young radicals made a particularly critical impact 
on the CDU, of which party’s substantial proportion of political constituents include those 
who previously supported the Nazi Party during World War II. Political contention in the 
late 1960s marked a political juncture in Germany with the transition of political power to 
the opposition Social Democratic Party and Willi Brandt.44 
Social movements that thrived in the 1960s across Western liberal states thrust 
protest in social sciences and the study of modern history. The nature of collectivity shared 
across the 1960s social movement and the intense involvement of individuals led to greater 
attention on collective action within contention and the actors. In contrast to the Marxist 
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arguments that had been shaped in the social disappointment of capitalism that coexisted 
with modern excitement, the contemporary contentious politics field was shaped with 
observations of grassroot protests and a more calculated, economic and rational approach 
and treated social movements as a part of individual behavior and decision-making.45  
Rational Approach: The Logic of Collective Action 
 Contemporary political scientists observed the explosion of contention and protests 
in the 1960s and questioned what made it possible, in the first place, to mobilize the mass 
of individuals to protest for collective good. Such inquiry holds the political rationalist 
assumption that men are rational and behave to maximize their individual self-interest. 
Thus, to political economists, individual sacrifice incorporated in collective contention 
itself is anomalous. For the marginal utility that individual would gain from the 
movement’s success is much smaller – this is because the benefits of civil rights protest 
would usually be a universal one than what would specifically increase only the 
participants’ marginal utility – than the effort that he or she would have to put in.46  
 In answering this collective action dilemma in 1960s-type contention patterns, 
political economist scholars diverged between individual explanation and material 
explanation with resource mobilization. One of the prominent rationalist and economic 
explanation was provided by Mancur Olson to answer this question. In The Logic of 
Contentious Action, Olson lays out the assumptions of the economic view of social 
organizations and collective movements. In Olson’s parsimony, all men strive to further 
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their self-interest and this nature consistently influences the organizational dynamics. 
Therefore, there will be tension between the group objective and individual objectives, and 
especially when economic profits are concerned. Olson argues that with the self-interested 
nature of men, it is illogical to assume any systematic altruism where individuals would 
pursue the group objectives at the expense of their own individual goals.47 Based on these 
assumptions, Olson attempts to find how close the individual interest and collective 
interests need to be, and how to involve as great proportion of the individuals to the 
collective objective. Thus, Olson finds the answer in the organizational context:  
Only a separate and “selective” incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a 
latent group to act in a group-oriented way. In such circumstances, group action can 
be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, like the 
collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively toward the 
individuals in the group…  
A latent group that has been led to act in its group interest, either because of 
coercion of the individuals in the group or because of positive rewards to those 
individuals, will here be called a “mobilized” latent group.48 
 
Olson argues that there must be individual and private rewards that tie the individuals with 
the collective objective. Therefore, Olson claimed that purely political organizations that 
has limited lobbying function without any involvement to the competition in the form of a 
market could not offer much positive inducements to create a selective mobilized group.49  
Olson’s argument attracted much attention, though social organization theories 
have been more or less compartmentalized into its own field from mainstream political 
science literature. On the other hand, Individual and non-material-oriented organization 
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theory did receive much criticisms as an aftermath of the 1960s surge of social movements. 
Unlike the sterile economic explanation of collective behavior that Olson assumes, 1960s 
was the manifestation of ideology-charged debate, and demonstrated that the individual 
altruism in collective actions nonetheless took a significant part of the social force.50 Thus, 
the subsequent theories of social organization and collective action tried to incorporate the 
ideology and moral prestige by introducing political opportunity structure and cultural 
framing, while succeeding the base work of collective social actions.  
Resource Explanation and Grievances, Collective Behavior 
Though Olson’s explanation omits the ideology-based behaviors, his introduction 
of material incentives or the “positive rewards” provided a break point for the resource 
mobilization approaches that developed further details of the utilization of rewards in social 
movements while shifting from the purely economic interpretations of social movement 
back to theoretical basis on the individual grievances and collectivized ideologies as the 
important variables. 51  In contrast to theories based on rational choice that sterilized 
individual choices of any emotions or ideologies, resource mobilization theorists that 
emerged after the emotionally charged debates of the 1960s deliberately assumed the 
significance of emotions and ideologies. Moreover, the character of resource mobilization 
approach made another break from the conventionally activist approaches in the social 
movement field. Many activism-based theories focus on problems of mobilization, aim to 
justify certain tactical choices and find the path of success; thus, resulted in much more 
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strategy-based theories. On the other hand, though limited, research approach theorists 
began to look at more analytical and theoretical problems-anomalies of social movement.52  
 Nevertheless, more recent resource mobilization theorists like McCarthy and Zald 
take a step further from the pure concern with discontent or from the collective action 
dilemma that Olson raises in terms of conflict between individual and collective interest. 
Instead, McCarthy and Zald look at how discontent that is common across diverse groups 
can be developed, defined and manipulated by entrepreneurs and organizations with access 
to resources both material, social and political.53 McCarthy and Zald identify, in particular, 
three entities that shape social movement, its processes and mobilizations: social 
movement organization (SMO), social movement industry (SMI) and social movement 
(SM) itself. McCarthy and Zald define SMO as “a complex, or formal, organization which 
identifies its goals with the preferenes of a social movement or a countermovement and 
attempts to implement those goals,” SMI as “[organizations] that have as their goal the 
attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement” and SM for social movement 
itself. These are the much less technical or economic categorization than groupings used 
by Olson that focused greatly interest groups.54 The distinct categorization by McCarthy 
and Zald adds greater emphasis on the relational aspect of social movement organizations 
and also show the scholars’ concerns of distinction between the mobilization itself, the 
organizational components and the multiplicity of the different social groups involved in 
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social movements. Nevertheless, for the broader SMOs to turn into SMI that more closely 
align with the goals of social movement, the SMOs control their resources to translate them 
most efficiently into mobilization and action. Therefore, resource mobilization approach 
seeks to identify the relationship between the social movement entities and variables that 
proves how such formal social networks lead to turning a non-adherent into an adherent of 
the collective.55  
Resource mobilization theories takes on the Olsonian dilemma and gives a hybrid-
type answer between materialist answer and organizational explanation – perhaps, 
theoretically speaking, in the midpoint between rational choice theorists and the 
organizationalists. One could also find the interdisciplinary influence of the resource 
mobilization trend in not only social movement, but also rebellion mobilization study like 
that of Inside Rebellion by Jeremy Weinstein that closely investigates the material 
incentives and the loyalty and effectiveness of mobilization and recruitment published n 
2006.56 Therefore, the resource mobilization approach sheds light onto the various possible 
approaches in social movement apart from the rationalist approaches. While the SMOs and 
SMIs in the American context in the 1960s is quite different from that shaped the social 
networks of South Korea or the dimensions of rewards or individual incentives, they give 
a good reference point in discussing the South Korean case and the social network later in 
the paper.  
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The “Holy Trinity”: Political Opportunity Structure (POS), Cultural Framing and Social 
Network 
 One of the most well-known contemporary contribution with repeated collective 
scholarly efforts to establish in the literature in the intersection of political science and 
sociology is the introduction of “political opportunity structure” into contentious politics 
as early as by Charles Tilly in 1978 in his book From Mobilization to Revolution, where 
Tilly for the first time conceptualized political opportunity in the context of contentious 
politics, protests and revolution along with the five key components of mobilization: 
interests, organization, mobilization, collective action and opportunity. In Tilly’s 
conception, these elements do not necessarily act in separation, but in collectivity to create 
political options for collective action to take place. 57  While Sidney Tarrow in 1994 
develops the concept further in the 2000s with Tilly and McAdam, scholars evaluate Tilly 
to have made a fundamental contribution to conceptualization of political opportunity 
structure in the context of political contention.58 The introduction of political opportunity 
structure essentially opened the field to the political processes explanations. Thus, the 
earlier political economist explanation of contentious behaviors sought to offer 
explanations and causes of contentious politics with clear cut formulas and conditions 
composed with concrete convention of interest groups or political organizations. In 
response, Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam’s literature flourished in the 2000s, consolidated the 
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subfield of “contentious politics” and offered explanation that consistently stayed with the 
spontaneity of mobilization unlike the formulaic predictions from the earlier rationalist 
explanations that dominated between 1970s and 1990s. 59  Despite their increasing 
interactions between theoretical basis, the fact that the contemporary scholars increasingly 
consider the importance of social interactions, ties and contextual framings and from the 
recent collective work by Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam, these scholars are also distinctively 
reliant upon the relational explanations.60 
Political Opportunity Structure 
 The essential argument of the political opportunity explanations and other relational 
explanations of contentious politics is that political opportunity structure allows all the 
potential social variables that may encourage political mobilization to translate into an 
“opportunity” where the people can react to. 61  Scholars define political opportunity 
structure as: “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national signals to social 
or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal 
resources to form social movements.”62 The argument of political opportunity structure 
enables a much looser explanation of contentious outbreaks, unlike traditional systematic 
theories that requires a complete generalizability and parsimony. This does not mean a less 
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substantiated explanation, but an explanation that accommodates various political 
processes as an explanation.   
Collective Action 
 Based on the frameworks of political opportunity structure, Sidney Tarrow in 1994 
first attempts to give a comprehensive review of the field in his book, Power in Movement, 
in which Tarrow locate the field roughly under the study of collective action.63 Tarrow 
defines contentious politics as a type of collective action, which “occurs within institutions 
on the part of constituted groups who act in the name of goals that are usually not 
contentious,” yet this becomes contentious, “when it is used by the people who lack regular 
access to institutions, act in the name of unaccepted claims that fundamentally challenge 
others.”64 However, Tarrow points out that not everyone with grievances come to act 
against the existing institutions, leading to a collective action dilemma within those people 
with grievances: often the risk of such actions are greater than the individual gains, unless 
there is a guarantee of success. Thus, the study of contentious politics looks at the threshold 
of when people decide to risk individual loss and what causes the group of people come 
together for contention, overcoming the collective action dilemma. Tarrow argues that the 
origin of such incentives for people to use contentious collective action comes from the 
“political opportunity structure –Political opportunity structures are composed of “specific 
configuration of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social 
mobilization”65 ability and availability to mobilize people through “social networks” with 
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the identifiable symbols that “culturally frames” the significance of the contentious 
collective actions, as the combination of these factors “lower the cost of bringing people 
together in collective action”66  
Dynamics of Contention and Mechanisms 
 By 2001, the contemporary political opportunity theorists – Charles Tilly, Sidney 
Tarrow and Douglas McAdam made a collective effort to combine the research and also 
renovate the theory and published, Dynamics of Contention. While built upon the shared 
trinity of political opportunity, cultural framing and social network, Dynamics of 
Contention rearranges the theoretical framework by adding the dimensions of 
“mechanisms.” Despite the fact that political opportunity structure catches a wide spectrum 
of cases where the theory is flexible in terms of explanation, the three co-authors were 
discontent that the model is still too rigid to explain fluid social phenomena like contention 
and mobilization.67 In Dynamics of Contention, the three scholars call the existing model, 
the static polity model. They argue that the polity model is limited to explain the episodic 
events of contention that is “contained” within the ruling government’s framework, but it 
is not very useful in explaining the larger scale, “transgressive contention” that goes 
beyond the given society’s rules of the game, but employs “innovative collective action” 
that adopt means or goals unprecedented or forbidden in the existing regime.68  
 The theory’s new addition of mechanisms is supposed to move the analysis from 
static to dynamics by identifying the various social processes involved in the series of 
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contentious episodes. This assumes that contentious politics have recurrent causal 
mechanisms commonly found from history in shared sequences and the authors argue that 
the individual mechanisms found from the past may also combine in other contentious 
processes. As the result, the mechanisms approach aims to explain the full cycle of 
contentious politics from the creation and transformation of actors, their political rise, 
repression or success of contention and eventual diffusion.69 The scholars streamline three 
mechanisms from a comprehensive, yet in-depth case studies across the world – 
environmental, cognitive and relational. Each mechanism respectively concerns the 
external conditions – resource, labor, etc. – that affects social life, the perceptual 
mechanism that operate within the contentious collective and the relational mechanisms 
that operate and interact with the social connections within contentious movement.70 
The Limits of Existing Literature in Answering the Empirical and Theoretical Questions 
 The proliferation of research on contentious politics and social movements in the 
past two hundred years provides significant explanations to refer to in terms of the cause, 
development and its decline back to institutionalization. However, the youth of the 
literature limits the unity of the scholarship in terms of different conceptions of contention. 
One of the biggest fragmentation of the literature comes from the ambiguous boundary 
between ‘contentious politics’ and ‘social movement.’ The spectrum of definitions varies 
in terms of spheres of activity, from specifically political struggles to a more open-ended 
collective movement formed under socio-cultural, political or even religious and 
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educational realm. David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi’s effort to a 
collaborative, contemporary-focused introduction to social movement studies define social 
movement as the more open-ended social struggle against the socio-cultural authority as 
“social movement” and the movement organized with clear emphasis on collective political 
struggle as “contentious politics,” based on the contexts that the words are widely used in 
the literature.71  
In addition to the ambiguity of the field, another limit in the young scholarship 
comes from the inevitable focus on the temporally episodic cases and those bound within 
the political institutions rather than dealing with political transitions. Moreover, due to the 
dominant theory of “cycles of protest,” while there may be temporal variability they are 
often understood in terms of the cycles instead of the possibility of protraction within the 
macro-social transition. Thus, separate development of the literature and distinct 
approaches employed in the two scholarship makes it difficult to produce research that 
combines both elements of contention and cases that differs from the sectoral contention 
within one unified political institutions.72 
The South Korean case, the empirical and theoretical questions posed earlier in the 
paper is a two-pronged question. The persisting identity of “Woon-dong-gwon” that is 
substantiated by the assertion of the language in the everyday news, consistent and easy 
observations of contention in the public spaces in South Korea begs the question of why 
                                                 
71 Snow, David, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2004. “Mapping the Terrain.” In Snow, et. al eds. The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing. 26.  
72 Snow, David, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2004. “Mapping the Terrain.” In Snow, et. al eds. The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing. 11; 
Also see Kim, Sun-chul. 2016. Democratization and Social Movements in South Korea: Defiant 
Institutionalization. Routledge Press. 4 
  
39 
contentious identity based on the 1980s democratization practices persist beyond the active 
protesting time frame of the 1980s. In answering this theoretical question, this paper will 
look at the prominence of ideological legitimacy of “Woon-dong-gwon” and its historical 
construction. This answer subsequently leads to the second issue for the sake of empirical 
validity, that an adequate answer must also be able to explain, on what basis such identity, 
nevertheless ceded to the rather controversial and perhaps, undemocratic ruling of 2014 
disintegration of the Unified Progressive Party. On the base of “Woon-dong-gwon’s” 
ideological construction of its persisting identity, the empirical question bears a greater 
puzzle, since we would expect a greater solidarity from an ideology-centered group. 
Therefore, as the scope of its influence and the prolonged duration goes beyond the existing 
political institutions or individual participation within the political arena, in order to explain 
the persisting existence of “Woon-dong-gwon” and the members’ continued psychological 
attachment to the contentious identity in the society necessitates an explanation that goes 
beyond the simple equation of collective action or struggle between the collective and 
individual interest. Empirically, the dissension within “Woon-dong-gwon” demonstrated 
in the 2014 Unification Party disintegration case necessitates an explanation that can 
incorporate identity, legitimacy and ideology.  
Historical Methodology 
 The main methods of analysis on the empirical case of South Korea is descriptive 
inference through historical analysis. In the social movement’s historical analysis 
evaluation by Lorezo Bosi, Bosi points out archival data and oral history as the two most 
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important methods in historical methodology.73 This paper primarily uses archival data, 
composed of mostly the remaining manifestos of contentious groups or accounts of 
individual protests rather than statistics compiled by the Korea Democracy Foundation and 
the public statistical data released by the South Korean government. Historical account of 
contemporary South Korean contentious politics between 1980s to present as well as the 
older account of contentious identities from the Japanese occupation and the Korean War 
will directly discuss the issue and origin of contentious legitimacy and how the two main 
factions interacted with historical legacy and legitimacy issues. Thus, historical analysis 
will not only discuss the episodic sequence, but also contextualize the buildup to 
contentious politics and the formation of South Korean “Woon-dong-gwon.” The 
construction of the unique South Korean contentious identity from the historical legacies 
will show how the secondary product of contentious politics could persist through the 
cycles of contention through turbulences.  
Historical methodology is one of the most intuitive and oldest tradition yet was 
officially developed as the scientific methods in the 20th century as social sciences 
increasingly emphasized scientism. In response to the mainstream focus on the statistical 
analysis historical analysis developed largely in the context of comparative politics by 
scholars like James Mahoney and in the context of social movement by Donatella della 
Porta.74 One of the biggest reason why I chose historical analysis is because of the critical 
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lack of statistical data preserved, especially as the paper deals greatly with the South 
Korean political history under multiple dictatorships and colonial oppression. In order for 
scientific substantiation of evidences and claims, the following section of the paper will 
rely on the primary sources and open archival collections from the Korea Democracy 
Foundation as well as newspapers of the time preserved by Naver Newspaper Library and 
the BIG Kinds, South Korean big data platform that provides news archives as well as 
statistical analysis from qualitative news datasets.  
Case of South Korea: Persistence of Contentious Identity 
Self-identification of “Woon-dong-gwon” and Generation 386 
 Socio-political psychology is a complex field of scholarship and even more so when 
resources are limited due to exogenous factors, such as government repressions. The lack 
of historical resource is one of the biggest problems of studying identity in South Korea, 
because of the astonishingly short record or systematic survey under democratic auspices 
that could provide reference points for identity formation. Fortunately, the origin and 
history of contentious actors’ self-identification can be found from the more specific 
generational title, the “generation 386”as a part of Woon-dong-gwon, coined by the 
contentious politics participants themselves in the early 2000s. While Woon-dong-gwon 
itself is also a widely used identification, the analysis of its core membership generation 
386 narrows the contentious identity down to its initial form, intention and development. 
In addition, generationally speaking, generation 386 deserves a distinct attention as the 
particular group of people does not belong to the typical generational divisions such as the 
generation X, Y, Z or the millennials. The widely used demographic division demarcates 
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the people groups by age, an objective factor and in the case of South Korea, by the nation’s 
economic stage, which is still more or less an element that inevitably affects the entire age 
generation socially and culturally, yet the generational divisions do not necessarily 
connotate distinct political affiliations or identities. On the other hand, generation 386 is 
an inherently different categorization as it is a self-proclaimed title that only applies to 
partial cohort of the age-divided generations, which led to the development of their socio-
political identity.75  
 “Generation 386” was first used in the 1990s to literally mean the generation in 
their 30s – in 1990s –, participated in student protest movements in the 1980s and are born 
in the 1980s. While generation 386 is also called generation 486, 586 as the cohort gets 
older, the particular cohort is most prominently known as generation 386.76 Though where 
the literal label originated is unclear and controversial between scholars and those self-
identify as part of the generation 386, a general consensus is that those self-identify as 
generation 386 have a unique and persisting attachment to the collective consciousness 
that frequently developed into political mobilization with distinct ideological emphasis.77  
In 1999, Sang Jin Han, a South Korean professor of sociology in Seoul National University 
who was part of the “Independence Generation” – born in the 1940s – that experienced the 
earlier stages of student protests conducted surveys on 1,200 of his generation 386 former 
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students. The issues that he was the most interested in were which events had the most 
significant influence in shaping the generation’s identity and their level of attachment to 
ideologies. With over fifty-percent response rate, 37% of the respondents picked the 1987 
June Uprising and 34% of the respondents chose Gwangju Struggle, both democratization 
movements adding up to over 70% of the entire responses. With other survey questions 
concerning the conflicts and even political contention that generation 386 students were 
involved in ten years after graduating university as well as questions on their own self-
identification, Han concludes that generation 386 cohort agrees to be particularly critical 
in their macro-societal views, they are ideological in their social involvements and they 
agree to their tendency to over-analyze social phenomena, signifying ideological rationale. 
An interesting finding is that generation 386 feels indebted to the people – Minjung – for 
their privilege to democracy and furthermore, national freedom.78 Contention was a critical 
element in the generation 386’s identity formation, not only because of their participatory 
experience under the dictatorships, but also because contention came to be formulated as 
the primary means to their historical duty to completely liberate the nation from repression, 
whether it be foreign occupation or authoritarian rule.  
This was not only the aggregate of personal development of identity which would 
be very difficult to measure other than only the recent surveys, but also the result of public 
politicization efforts observable through news and public media. For example, in the early 
2000s, conservative and progressive newspapers in South Korea both tried to influence the 
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public perception of generation 386 through special reporting series. In 1999, Chosun Ilbo 
opened the public discourse on the role of generation 386 through their special 
investigation series, “Korea’s Main Force, Generation 386.” The conservative media’s 
strategy was to downplay the political role and popularity of the student protests and the 
politicians from the student leadership through establishing generation 386 as a age-based 
generational category. Focusing on political irrelevant, but a variety of attractive themes of 
computer, camera, alcohol, cosmetics, etc., trying to equate the student participants of the 
democratization movements with the rest of the university students who were not 
politically active. Such conservative efforts did contribute in spreading out the meaning of 
generation 386 from a politically conscious collective, particularly anchored upon their 
participation in contention to the generic, naïve university students in their twenties.79 In 
response, Hankyeoreh News also published special reports on “Political experimentation 
of Generation 386” and “Political institutionalization of generation 386” only four months 
after Chosun Ilbo’s special reporting. In turn, Hankyeoreh News called for a heightened 
role of the generation 386 in the political arena, so far as to a generational change in South 
Korean politics from the older, privileged politicians to the generation that conceive of 
democracy as people’s participation. 80  Therefore, such publicized discourse over the 
automatically expected or assumed role of generation 386 in South Korean politics right 
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after democratization also further consolidated the generation’s conception of their 
participation in politics both via the institutionalized venue or through contention as the 
generation’s unique historical duty. The question, then comes back to how this identity 
centered around collective contentious memory first originated, developed and was 
reinforced overtime.  
Historical Background of South Korean Transition to Democracy and Brief History of 
Contentious Politics  
As the central argument of the thesis concerns the historical evidences to explain 
the persisting contentious identity of Woon-dong-gwon, it is crucial to understand the 
historical background of South Korean transition from dictatorship to democracy. Within 
the very short history of contemporary South Korean state, which started only after 1945, 
when Japan forfeited their colonial rule over the Korean peninsula, the history of 
democratization can be discussed in largely three big periods: the Syng Man Rhee Regime 
(1948-1960), Park Chung Hee Regime (1963-1979) and Chun Doo Hwan Regime (1980-
1988). The reason for such historical division would be, the fact that these three rulers’ 
undeniable impact on South Korean national formation, development and administration. 
While there were many short periods of governance before democratization other than the 
three dictators, they were often chaotic in terms of governance with lack of effective 
leadership. Moreover, in the forty years between the end of Korean War and institutional 
democratization in 1987, democratic rule lasted for a fleeting duration. 
Syng Man Rhee Regime (1948-1960), the Issue of Illegitimacy and the April 19 
Movement  
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 Though he was the first president of South Korea, Syng Man Rhee’s regime was an 
interesting one, because Rhee’s regime was greatly concerned with its security, foreign 
policy and ideological battle rather than internal statecraft. Korean historians locate the 
reasons of such characteristics to the international Cold War as well as Rhee’s late start in 
the statecraft scene in the Korean peninsula and a rather abnormal dependence on the 
United States for his political ascendance. 81  Kang records that there were two most 
important paths of independence movement during the Japanese colonial rule: one was a 
direct confrontation of Japanese Empire through militarization through temporary 
government establishments in Machuria and Shanghai. The other was diplomatic approach 
to gain foreign attention to the Japanese atrocities in the Korean peninsula and gain 
Western support for the Wilsonian Self-Determination of Korean nation. Rhee was a pro-
U.S. and pro-West intellectual that spent a substantial amount of his independence 
movement career in the U.S. Although Rhee was authorized with the U.S.-branch Korean 
Temporary Government by the central auspices in Shanghai and Siberia, Rhee’s domestic 
prominence or influence was minimal.82 On the other hand, the combination of pro-military, 
pro-communists made the first, preemptive comprehensive effort to establish official 
Korean state after independence. Within a few months since liberation, the leftwingers-led 
People’s Committees were established in almost every important city in the peninsula. 
Therefore, while the independent, socialist statecraft effort was already in place, the U.S. 
trusteeship with Syng Man Rhee as the U.S. puppet was suddenly put in place and “made 
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a big reversal.” The reversal effort by the U.S. was not shy of coercive means, consequently 
leading to a separate presidential election in the South with the urges of the pro-U.S. 
factions. Despite some nationlists’ continued opposition to a separate election, the election 
was pushed through and Rhee became the first president of the Republic of Korea.83  
 Election of Rhee as the president was hastily organized and forced by the pro-U.S. 
factions, but it was also seen as an illegitimate process by many nationalists. Rhee himself 
seemed to most nationalists to have taken advantage of the chaos and the support from the 
U.S. that was only another colonial power. Moreover, for most nationalists, Rhee was an 
elite representative that did not physically commit himself to the hard work in the domestic 
anti-colonial movements. More importantly, the pro-U.S. politicians were the former pro-
Japanese factions – who were also Korean nationals themselves – that took advantage of 
the U.S. intervention and tried to avoid the more aggressive, leftwing nationalists. 84 
Therefore, the issue of illegitimacy presided over the beginning of Rhee administration and 
public suspicion only worsens with the mysterious assassination of the popular anti-U.S.  
nationalist, Kim Gu one year before the Korean War broke out and the execution of the 
opposition leader Cho Bong Ahm in 1959.85  
 Under the public scrutiny of the “grafted state” and the threats of the continuously 
influential leftwing leaders that remained in the South, Syng Man Rhee focused his 
political capital in eradicating the leftwing leaders and the anti-U.S. nationalists. The 
                                                 
83 Jung, Hae Gu and Ho Ki Kim. n.d. “Development of Democratization Movement in South Korea.” 
Stanford Freeman Spogli nstitute for International Studies Publications. 2.  
84 Kang Man Gil. 2013. Rewritten Korean Contemporary History. Changbi Publishers. 292-300. 
85 "Record of Conversation between Kim Gu and Liu Yuwan," July 11, 1948, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, Syngman Rhee Institute. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119630.  
  
48 
Korean War only radicalized such Korean-version Red Scare under the Rhee Regime and 
further institutionalized the scare in the public psyche as well. Therefore, the initially 
dominant leftwing politicians or movement leaders were soon quickly eliminated from the 
society after the Korean War. The execution of his political rival, Cho Bong Ahm in 1959 
was also coerced with such anti-communist ideologies. As the result, Rhee Regime wielded 
a significant amount of political power when it came to anti-communist policies and 
ironically, the pro-liberal Rhee tried to institutionalize his dictatorship through the 
fabricated election consensus.86 Besides election fraud, Rhee mobilized a group of radical 
anti-communists to create a political gang to disintegrate the National Congress in 1952 so 
that Rhee could coerce a popular election, rather than an indirect election by the Congress.87 
However, continued election fraud without much domestic policy efforts made by Rhee 
led to increased frustration on the grassroots level. Finally, in the third presidential election 
since Rhee took power, Rhee tried all kinds of voting fraud once again, by violating voting 
in secrecy, employing gangs and exchanging voting boxes. This comprehensive and 
explicit disregard of democratic election process led to a nation-wide protest against voting 
fraud, which finally led to Rhee’s concession of power.88  
 Syng Man Rhee Regime was not the most brutal or the longest authoritarian rule in 
the South Korean history. However, the fact that Rhee’s ascendance to political power was 
illegitimate to begin with – at least from the nationalist perspectives – leads to the 
inheritance and prolongation of the legitimacy problem of the political establishment and 
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the state-level disregard of the nationalists under the Japanese Occupation. Moreover, 
Korean War complicated the grassroots discourse after the Korean War as the Rhee regime 
succeeds to institutionalize a radical anti-communism into the public’s psyche. Therefore, 
the Rhee Regime created the foundation of not only the ruling illegitimacy, but also 
division within the public, and these issues were transferred over to the contentious politics 
of the grassroots. The contentious actors began to seek for greater legitimacy over the 
ruling government, and the South Korean state was easily seen as the convenient auspices 
of the national traitors with power bestowed by a foreign power. In terms of Rhee Regime’s 
almost immediate transition into the Park Chung Hee Coup regime, historians attribute a 
certain degree of cause to Syng Man Rhee’s obsession on the ideology, while ignoring the 
desperate economic situation.89  
Park Chung Hee Regime (1963-1979)  
 With the April 19th Movement, Rhee conceded his political power to the 
Democratic Party only to be collapsed by the military Coup d’état led by South Korean 
Army Major General Park Chung Hee. The fall of the Democratic Party government came 
without a fight. Rather, the historians later record the event as an easy concession to the 
military coup, as the Democratic Party itself was not ready for a systematic rule of the 
entire country.90 With the manifestation of the immature government and the weak people, 
despite the successive of April Revolution, Park Regime only exacerbated the problem of 
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illegitimate government and exposed the inability of the contentious movement’s tangible 
transfer of political power from revolution to civilian government.  
 Park Chung Hee was a former officer in the Japanese military, and had personal 
admiration of the Japanese culture, the rapid development and Japanese achievement of 
modernity equivalent to that of the Western powers.91 For a Japanese-style modernization 
and industrialization, Park pushed for an aggressive economic and industrial reform 
immediately after he took power with the 5-Year Economic Development Plan – an 
ironically socialist-sounding policy. As the result, with aggressive allocation of labor, 
resources and borrowing of capital with Park’s unilateral decision to send cheap South 
Korean labor to foreign development projects, Park’s economic plan consequently was 
successful albeit at the expense of democratic freedom. Park’s aggressive economic plan 
enforcement was indeed revolutionary in his policy enactment, but also by the efforts of 
internalizing radical development as the national destiny for survival. Thus, Park’s 
dictatorship and emphasis on national wealth reinforced totalitarianism, but also led to 
many people’s voluntary submission to the national goal.92  
 Nevertheless, Park’s economic success did not end democratization movement. 
The movement actors were well aware of the equally illegitimate authority wielded by Park, 
not only because he ascended through military coup, but also because he was ideologically 
anti-national with his pro-Japan affiliation. Thus, the temporarily dormant movement 
erupted with the Korea-Japan Conference, when Park tried to normalize the bilateral 
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relations for economic gains. According to the Kim Jong Pil-Ohira Memo, Park agreed to 
normalize relations with Japan with Japan paying South Korea 300 million USD non-
repayable grant, 200 million USD government-issued loan through the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund and 100 million USD commercial loan.93 As civilian protest continued 
to resist the agreement, U.S. intervened in the process to provide new momentum for the 
negotiation to pass by organizing the tripartite talk. The dimension of Park administration 
borrowing the hands of the U.S. at the time of national discontent resembles the Rhee 
Regime, leading to the question of legitimacy closely related to increase in the popular 
anti-U.S. sentiment.94 
With the Korea-Japan Conference, public contention intensified towards the end of 
1960s. Like Rhee Regime, President Park also tried to extend his rule by coordinated voting 
fraud in 1967. However, with the military behind the back of Park, the student protests 
were once again unable to overcome the Park Regime. After his election for the third time 
through voting fraud, Park further strengthened his authoritarian grip as the inter-
peninsular relations aggravated with reciprocal efforts to terrorize the other. By the late 
1960s, Park managed to militarize schools by incorporating mandatory military training 
and institutionalized antagonism towards the North. Naturally, militarization of the entire 
society led to a greater paranoia about the North. Park’s oppression peaked with the 1971 
Yushin Restoration.  
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 Yushin Restoration entailed a complete upheaval of even the nominally democratic 
system. While Park claimed the purpose of Yushin system as a national security strategy 
against the increasing threat from the North and potential for a national emergency as the 
result of changing international atmosphere in the 1970s. Simultaneously, South Korea 
under Park was also going through an economic recession with high inflation rate, which 
in combination with the continuously toxic labor environment since the early 1960s, led to 
an explosion of labor movement. This was the first time labor movement created a separate, 
collective protesting force ignited with a young student laborer, Chun Tae Il’s public 
suicide by self-burning.95 The contagion of contentious movement from mostly students – 
like seen in the April 19th Movement – to laborers in the public arena developed into the 
first ever large-scale contentious movement, protesting against the system rather than 
individual group’s particular interests. Therefore, despite the relative decrease in the level 
of contention during the particularly oppressive Park military regime along with economic 
advancement, scholars evaluate the impactful uprisings in the traditionally pro-Park 
regions like Busan and Masan to have caused internal breakdown of the regime, leading to 
Park’s assassination by the Korea Central Intelligence Agency Director, Kim Jae Gyu.96 
 Although almost two-decades long dictatorship under Park Chung Hee seemingly 
have fallen apart on its own, historians assess that the 1970s was when the democratization 
movement forces have consolidated as a unified collective. As part of the recent Stanford 
Korea Democracy Project, Paul Chang and Gi Wook Shin analyzed the alliance formation 
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particularly during the Park Chung Hee regime. In his research, Chang concluded that the 
increased level of repression under the Park Regime, ultimately led to the unintended 
consequences of alliance formation across classes, occupations and age groups. 97  In 
addition to the novel statistical analysis of the Stanford Korea Democracy Project, the 
closer-up analysis of the declarations, statements, once again, demonstrate further 
consolidation of the public perception of government illegitimacy and the people’s 
historical duty to “continue national liberation.”98 
Chun Doo Hwan Regime (1980-1988), Gwangju and the June Uprising 
 The death of Park Chung Hee was celebrated as the final “spring of Seoul” after all 
the protracted transitional hiccoughs. Nevertheless, in less than two months, the neo-
military forces seized military and political power through another coup d’état and elected 
Chun Doo Hwan as their leader. Chun was known to have admired Park Chung Hee’s 
military leadership. In the process, student organization and labor movements were to 
retaliate against yet another abortion of democratization. According to the record of the 
12.12. Incident – 1979 Coup – by a public critique and former politician, Yoo Si Min, 
nation-wide university student leadership association met on May 17, 1980 and agreed 
upon a simultaneous, nation-wide protest in the case of school cancellation. However, 
when all school were cancelled under national emergency declaration late May, it was only 
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Gwangju that kept the promise of demonstrations.99 In combination with public resentment 
towards the military’s unwarranted arrest of the popular movement leader, Kim Dea Jung, 
alliance across all types of Gwangju residents formed to retaliate against the military. The 
city-wide uprising against the military initially seemed to liberate the city from the military 
auspices. However, ultimately, the military regime committed over 20,000 soldiers into 
Gwangju alone to murder 166 at site, critically injure over 400 who all died after the 
injury.100  
 Besides the humanitarian problem of the Gwangju Massacre, this incident led the 
Democratic Constitution Securement Association People’s Protest Center to conclude that 
the atrocity was caused because of the failure to a simultaneous national uprising. The June 
Uprising in 1987 that finally achieved the military dictatorship’s concession to the popular 
democracy and was basically a national enlargement of the Gwangju Uprising. 
Nevertheless, up until the 1987 June Uprising succeeded to subdue the Chun military 
regime, the Chun’s military rule managed to deliver all dictatorial brutality and strictly 
personal corruption and undemocratic proceedings. 
Unfinished Democracy and Continued Political Tension 
 1987 marked the end of almost 30-year-long dictatorship in South Korea through a 
nation-wide, simultaneous uprising that even the military was unable to force down like 
Chun did in Gwangju, seven years ago. However, evaluations of 1987 reform vary. This is 
because the June Uprising may also have brought about only the institutional changes to 
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the system, instead of fundamental changes to power structure. The limits of 1987 reform 
is the most clearly shown from the election of Roh Tae Woo in the subsequent election 
after Chun conceded to the protests. Roh Tae Woo was Chun Doo Hwan’s henchman. This 
was not another result of voting fraud or illegal intervention by Roh or Chun, but it was a 
pure indicator of the limited democratic maturity of the people as well as the multiple 
democratic candidates, who ended up splitting votes for the democratic sides. While there 
are many more incidents that manifest the immaturity of South Korean democracy, the 
level of details does not serve the scope of this paper. However, the fact that the South 
Korean democratization history is still a continuous story leaves the ideals and 
consciousness that pulled the people together in the 70s and 80s still alive in the minds of 
contention today as well. The degree of different generation’s ability to sympathize with 
the causes, the ideals, continued frustration towards the government’s illegitimacy that 
bleeds into today’s politics demonstrate that the mobilizing identity of movement politics 
stay within the South Korean politics now. Therefore, based on the general historical 
review of history and the constant theme of legitimacy found in the democratization 
movement identity in the 70s and 80s, the following section will concretely locate the 
commonly shared and inherited identity in the movement actors’ consciousness of 
historical duty to a legitimate government since the early 1900 independence movement.  
The Construction of the Contemporary Contentious Identity, Ideology and Historical 
Morality 
1. National Liberation Legitimacy: Independence to Democratization Seen from the 
Woon-dong-gwon Scholars Perspectives 
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 From the literature of contentious movement and those written by the actors 
themselves, I find Korean modern history central to the construction of the contemporary 
contentious identity. This can be seen clearly from the historical narrative created by the 
generation 386 and Woon-dong-gwon national history scholars. An important theme 
shared among South Korean national historians is the simultaneous consciousness and 
emphasis of national division and history of Japanese colonialization reflected in their work 
as central factors in the history of South Korean modernization and democratization 
process. Therefore, South Korean narrative of democratization history is not isolated as 
one distinct movement, but a deeply intertwined historical process of national liberation. 
Within South Korean perception of macro-national history of liberation, democratization 
bears its particular significance in its prolongation of the national independence from 
Japanese occupation as well as the ongoing efforts of liberation from the national 
division.101 And the epitome of this early form of contentious movement against colonial 
occupation was the March 1st Movement.  
March 1st Movement as the Cornerstone of Contentious Identity Formation and Movement 
Legitimacy 
 Prior to any specific references made to substantiate that the contentious 
democratization movement in the late 1980s as well as the continued presence of the 
identity among Woon-dong-gwon and generation 386 who are the core and initial 
component of contentious movement, it would be necessary to review history of March 1st 
Movement, 1919. 
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 March 1st Movement in 1919 was a collective, nation-wide retaliation against the 
Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula that started in 1910. The movement was first 
conceived among religious leaders as a request to the Japanese government of Korean 
independence. However, as Woodrow Wilson’s principle of national self-determination 
was met by international resonance, Korean independence movement also saw an 
opportunity of Korea’s international recognition through a peaceful declaration of Korean 
independence from the Japanese. While the movement was initially planned and centered 
around the thirty three National Representatives that officially signed on the Declaration 
of Independence, March 1st Movement, the protest itself was mostly delivered by the 
ordinary Korean people voluntarily.102 
 There are three important aspects of the March 1st Movement that distinguishes the 
movement from any other series of protest in determining the national consciousness. First, 
the March 1st movement marks the beginning of the Korean modernity and period of 
nationalism. According to the nationalism scholar, Liah Greenfeld, nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon that occurs when the constituent people gains the collective consciousness as 
the fundamentally equal member of the society while all members believe in the nation’s 
popular self-sovereignty. 103  Likewise, within the March 1st Movement, majority of 
population actively called for a fundamentally equal society, a republican democracy, 
while only few called to revert back to the premodern kingdom. 104  Second, with the 
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majority of participants’ seeking true “national liberation” from all sorts of restraints to 
liberty, from colonialism to inequality before colonialization, the March 1st Movement 
brought about political liberalism in a society that had long been a pre-modern and isolated 
kingdom. Lastly, the March 1st Movement is a crucial reference point where the 
organizational theme of “nation-wide, simultaneous uprisings.” 105  The logistical 
arrangement of contention may not seem to be a very important variable. However, when 
the contention plans could not be propagated through social media or long-distance 
communications tool was not possible. Along with the ideological consistencies, the 
logistical similarity goes a further way than it seems. For example, the Gwangju Uprising 
in 1980, was also the result of the National University Student Association’s promise to 
carry out a nation-wide, simultaneous protest, so that the government cannot invest on one 
single protest. Thus, learning from the previous experience, the contentious leaders in the 
1987 finally succeeds with the peaceful national contentious movement, so that the 
government  cannot concentrate on quelling one movement.106 
Continued Symbolism in the South Korean Contemporary Politics  
The 1987 South Korean National Constitution declares that the South Korean 
democratic nation-state stands based on the Independence Movement morale from the 
March 1st Movement:  
We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from 
time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea 
Government born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919 and the 
democratic ideals of the April Nineteenth Uprising of 1960 against injustice, having 
assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our 
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homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with justice, 
humanitarianism and brotherly love, and To destroy all social vices and 
injustice…107 
 
There may be counterarguments regarding the particular narratives of Korean 
contemporary democratization history and its consistency with the earlier national 
liberation movements in the academic sphere. However, regardless of the room for 
controversy on the choices made in historiography among historians, the fact that those 
self-identify as Woon-dong-gwon scholars view democratization movements as historical 
succession of the national liberation duty does not disqualify the consistent themes and 
evidences of it as what Woon-dong-gwon based their legitimacy.  
Protest arrangements in the 1980s and 1990s also demonstrate the significance of 
national liberation theme in democratization. For example, the 1976 protest against the 
Chun military dictatorship and the announcement called, “Declaration of Democratic 
National Liberation” were deliberately planned on March 1 to commemorate the March 1st 
Movement in 1919 – March 1st movement was the earliest nation-wide contentious 
movement that took place in South Korea simultaneously in March 1, 1919 as peaceful 
resistance against the Japanese military colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.108 The 
declaration in 1978 consequently led to imprisonment of some of the most important 
contentious democratization movement leaders like Kim Dae Jung, Yoon Bo Sun and 
sixteen others. Over the course of legal battle over the movement leadership’s sentence, 
many statements have been publicized including those released by the Korea Democracy 
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Foundation. These documents reveal repeated and popular references to the earlier 
“Independence Movements spirit” as the basis of their action’s legitimacy. 109  Such 
legitimation of democratization movement is commonly seen in other scenes of protests 
than those involving politicians like the “March 1st Declaration of Democratic National 
Liberation.” As a matter of fact, greater solidarity and tight organizational structure within 
nation-wide student protestors and unions was the distinct feature of the 1980s university 
students or the generation 386. Immediately after the June Uprising, 1987, university 
students formed a national student organization as the students saw a period of chaos and 
uncertainty after Chun Doo Hwan’s concession to the uprising. Documents and statements 
that are left from the recruitment efforts appeal to the ideological duty of students by 
comparing the dictatorship with the Japanese colonial rule. Some radical statements also 
delegitimized the establishment politicians to have inherited their political powers from the 
Japanese, taking advantage of the chaos in the interim period of the 1950s.110 
The March 1st Movement and Its Ideological Significance in Creating the Collective 
Contentious Identity  
 Therefore, the March 1st Movement’s ideological influence in the national 
liberation narrative is fundamental in the fact that the movement proved that the Korean 
people have gone through a new type of consciousness and that the reality has clearly 
changed from a premodern kingdom to a worthwhile individuals who are capable of 
seeking liberty and equality just the same as that of others who might have been the nobles 
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under the old kingdom. However, as seen in the earlier historical review, the emergence of 
dictatorships after independence from the Japanese occupation led to historical reversal 
back to restrain national liberation. The authoritarian rulers had constant issues of 
legitimacy in terms of their role in national liberation – which is oppressor, indistinct from 
that of Japanese colonizers. This problem exacerbates with the repeated revival of 
dictatorship and the stubborn remnants in the political arena and became a chronic problem 
in the South Korean contemporary politics. Thus, on the other hand, the century old search 
for the national liberation was never fulfilled until now, because the current nominal 
democratization is not something fundamentally called for in the times of 1980s and 1970s, 
which are still a very tangible and live memories for core group of Woon-dong-gwon, the 
generation 386. For these complicated reasons and circumstances, generation 386 and 
Woon-dong-gwon elites are unable to let go of the outdated, yet currently relevant mission 
of national liberation until after the nominal and institutional democratization. 
Institutionalization versus Ideology: the two factions, NL-PD  
 Finally, discussions of ideology and national liberation gained from the 
revolutionary March 1st Movement leads to the empirical puzzle of the indifferent reaction 
of the Justice Party towards the United Progressive Party in 2014. Although both Justice 
Party and the United Progressive Party are “sister political parties” originating from the 
Woon-dong-gwon traditions, party politics is inherently distinct arena from contentious 
politics, the discussion of the puzzle must include the issue of contentious actors’ process 
of institutionalization, but a “defiant” one as coined by the sociologist, Sun Chul Kim. Kim 
defines such defiant or reluctant institutionalization of contentious politics as, “social 
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movements becoming a routine of everyday politics, but differs from this conventional 
understanding of institutionalization in that social movements are not entirely assimilated 
into the norms or practices of the political establishment.”111 Therefore, as political parties, 
both Justice Party and the UPP inevitably are expected to assimilate to a certain degree of 
political norms – though the UPP’s defiance may have cause the disintegration decision by 
the court. On the other hand, in the particular case of South Korea the UPP, a national 
liberation-focused Woon-dong-gwon party had a greater appeal towards ideology, national 
liberation than Justice Party that comes from the People’s Democratic tradition of South 
Korean Woon-dong-gwon.  
National Liberation and People’s Democracy 
 The two biggest factions of South Korean Woon-dong-gwon compose of National 
Liberation (NL) and People’s Democracy (PD). The two frameworks emerged in the 1980s, 
when the greater South Korean population began to receive higher education, with the 
generation 386 being the first cohort to get such access. Scholars in South Korea have long 
discussed the emergence of such distinct public framework under the most brutal period of 
dictatorship, while South Korea has not seen another type of such public political 
framework to emerge ever since. Some scholars interpreted the phenomenon as an 
expression to extend the political framework, while political power is not accessible. 
Therefore, within the contentious movement framework, students and laborers created a 
pseudo-political arena, with their biggest concern being the nation and people, particularly 
                                                 
111 Kim, Sun Chul. 2016. “Introduction” in Democratization and Social Movements in South Korea: 
Defiant Institutionalization. Kim eds. Routledge Press. 
  
63 
the laborers. Moreover, as the atrocities of Gwangju Uprising began to reveal among the 
contentious actors, critical self-consciousness expanded across intelligentsia and 
contentious actors to take on some sort of action.112 While the two factions had not born 
acute differences like today when they were first conceptualized, NL faction was more 
concerned with the nationalist liberation of the all people, to include both North and the 
South. Moreover, a distinct feature of the NL camp was their strict positions on foreign 
policy, anti-U.S. interventions in domestic policies. Particularly because the NL camp was 
much more ideologically-rooted for nationalism and absolute sovereignty of the people, 
NL camp tended to create an isolated political faction, unwilling to compromise on a lot of 
the issues. Such characteristics often came into conflicts when the NL camp needed to 
come into political alliance with other parties or movements.113 Historically, NL faction 
had been stronger in their authority and popularity throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
On the other hand, PD faction had a particular concern of the laborers, wage, 
working conditions and employer-employee relations. Thus, PD faction was naturally a 
more close-knit, smaller group. Moreover, both factions initially had a certain degree of 
belief in the Marxist modernization theory. Though the factions did not have a deep faith 
in having to revolutionize the South Korean society, the anti-imperialist Marxism appealed 
to Koreans at the time.114 
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While under the series of dictatorships, NL faction had been more popular for their 
broader appeal to the grassroots as well as the elites. This changed as South Korea started 
to democratize after 1987 and particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union that held 
the shared ideological anchor of national liberation as well as the worker’s rights and 
freedoms. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was an anomie among the 
young Marxist elites. Since then, the two camps of NL and PD also became much narrower. 
Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea was also rapidly incorporated 
into the international capitalist system. Naturally, the NL-type radical political and 
ideological fervor that dominated the 1980s and 1990s had to be converted into economic 
force.  
At the face of social tension, however, both the NL and PD camps did not entirely 
conform to the new capitalistic order. It was the NL camp that had particularly difficult 
time with the process of even partial institutionalization, while the PD factions 
conveniently had the already small and tight group of people that were specifically 
passionate about the social welfare and labor safety in South Korea. On the other hand, NL 
camp experienced a significant setback in terms of institutionalization. Though the theme 
of National Liberation continues to get popular support, the political capital not comes at 
very different style among the new generations, not necessarily through committing to 
collectivized movement encompassing the entirety of their social life, but through more 
individualized ways.115  
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Nevertheless, the NL camp’s inflexibility came at much greater cost than expected. 
In comparison to the specific membership expectation of PD camp and their flexibility and 
tolerance towards their faction’s incorporation to the political arena, NL faction revealed 
an allergic reaction to any of their member’s official political participation, out of the public 
space. Particularly within political party membership, NL camp strongly insisted that the 
NL camp and its direct political party solely had political legitimacy. Thus, all the members 
who decided to join other political parties, including the existing opposition party – The 
Minjoo Party – were considered traitors.  Particularly because of the NL camp’s own 
inflexibility in terms of ideology as well as its membership, NL faction was increasingly 
isolated from the mainstream political discourses. Ultimately, the public and conservative 
scrutiny of National Liberation camp to be pro-North Korea ironically, delegitimized the 
NL-based United Progressive Party in 2014.116 
Therefore, the disintegration of the United Progressive Party came at the acute 
isolation of the party and their radical adherence to the NL identity of the Woon-dong-
gwon. Though the Justice Party’s indifference may seem like an anomaly, yet when 
contextualized, the long isolation of the NL faction from all political parties, including the 
PD camp and the Democratic opposition party for history of compromises, Justice Party’s 
indifference was an expected turn, and the radical NL camp may not have even wanted the 
Justice Party’s intervention either. Moreover, with the incendiary allegation included in the 
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court case of UPP, Justice Party’s nonintervention in the political turmoil consequently 
preserved the moderate branch of the organized contentious camp.  
Conclusion 
 The discussion of national liberation and the greater historical duty in contentious 
identity is perhaps, not a new phenomenon. However, contemporary Korean political 
history scholars have concluded that such gap in the understanding of South Korean 
contentious identity from historical construction came from the long-time domination of 
the conservative authoritarian rule over not only the political power, but also into the areas 
of academia and cultural norm construction. Lee Jun-sik evaluates that despite the manifest 
ideological basis given by the March 1st Movement in many official and unofficial political 
evidences, such as the Korean constitution, a concentrated study of National Liberation 
and contentious identity has been tabooed under Korean academia that has not been fully 
liberated from the grips of establishment conservatives until recently. This is also shown 
in the development of the history textbook in South Korea: Under the Rhee, Park and 
Chung Regime, the word “national liberation” was banned in interpreting the South Korean 
independence. Under Syng Man Rhee, all independence movements have been narrated 
based on the Rhee leadership. Under the militaristic rule of Park and Chung, interpretation 
of the independence movement has been completely changed into militarized struggles 
against the Northern leftwingers.117 Therefore, an understanding of the contentious identity 
as a continual phenomenon inherited from the March 1st Movement and the early forms of 
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contentious politics have been thoroughly eliminated until recently. Moreover, the 
international contentious politics literature that has been largely promoting the cyclical 
aspects of contention with structuralist academic basis not only devalued the issue of 
ideological contentious identities apart from rational interest, but also gave little weight to 
the possibility of South Korean contentious identity as a continuation from the national 
liberation since the 1900s.118 Moreover, despite the apparent rumors of disintegration of 
contentious identity along with the NL-based United Progressive Party in 2014, continued 
public observations of contention with the shared theme of across South Korea even after 
the UPP disintegration substantiates that the South Korean contentious identity has only 
transferred to the next generation to re-interpret national liberation. Moreover, the 
continued public, accessible discourse among the new generation and the new social 
network through social media, the framing of “national liberation” is consistently seen from 
the recent Park impeachment rallies, continued demonstrations for the comfort women 
issues and public contentious response towards the Moon Jae In government’s amendment 
efforts. Perhaps it is only the mobilizational structure and forms of contention that have 
recreated as contention passed on to the next generation. 
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